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Optimal decoy intensity for decoy quantum key distribution
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In the decoy quantum key distribution, we show that a smaller decoy intensity gives a better key
generation rate in the asymptotic setting when we employ only one decoy intensity and the vacuum
pulse. In particular, the counting rate of single photon can be perfectly estimated when the decoy
intensity is infinitesimal. The same property holds even when the intensities cannot be perfectly
identified. Further, we propose a protocol to improve the key generation rate over the existing
protocol under the same decoy intensity.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk,03.67.-a,05.30.Jp
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) by BB84 protocol
[1] is one of the most important applications of quan-
tum information. The original QKD requires the single
photon source. However, many economically realizable
photon sources produce only weak coherent pulses. So,
they cannot be used for the original QKD protocol. To
solve this problem, we need to estimate the detection
rate of the single photon pulse. Hwang [2] proposed the
decoy method, in which, we estimate the detection rate
of the single photon pulse from the detection rates of
the weak coherent pulses with different intensities. As
another solution, continuous variable quantum key dis-
tribution works with weak coherent pulses. (see [21] and
references therein) While continuous variable quantum
key distribution can be implemented with an inexpen-
sive Homodyne detection, the decoy method with BB84
protocol can achieve the longest distance with the cur-
rent technology[14, 15]. So, it is natural to focus on the
decoy method.
In the decoy method, we employ two kinds of weak
coherent pulses; One is the signal pulse, which generates
raw keys. The other is the decoy pulse, which is used
only for the estimation of the detection rate of the single
photon pulse. The key point is the difference between
the signal and decoy intensities µs and µd, which are
the intensities of the signal and decoy pulses. Using the
detection rates of these pulses, the decoy method deter-
mines a lower bound of the detection rate of single pho-
ton pulse. However, it cannot uniquely determine this
detection rate although it has been improved by many
researchers [3–11]. To improve this estimation, the pa-
pers [7, 8] proposed to increase the number of the decoy
intensities, and showed that this detection rate can be
uniquely determined when the number of the decoy in-
tensities is infinitely large. However, it strains the net-
work system of QKD to increase the number of decoy
intensities. So, it is better to realize a precise estimation
without increase of this number.
In this paper, we focus on the case when we employ
only one decoy intensity µd and the vacuum pulse for the
estimation of the detection rate of single photon pulse.
Firstly, we consider a formula for secure key generation
rate that is different from the conventional one. Indeed,
while the paper [18] discussed the key generation rate of
finite-length setting, our formula can be regard as the
asymptotic version of the key generation rate given in
[18]. We show that our our formula is better than the
conventional one. Secondly, we optimize the choice of
the decoy intensity. This kind of optimization for the
conventional formula for the asymptotic key generation
rate has been done by Ma et al [5] when the source in-
tensities are perfectly controlled. We derive the same op-
timization for our improved formula for the asymptotic
key generation rate. Further, similar to Wang [10, 11], we
extend these result to the case when the intensities are
different from our intent. Even in this generalization, we
still have the same conclusion. On the other hand, Ma et
al [5] also considered a similar optimization for the con-
ventional formula for the asymptotic key generation rate
when the source intensities have statistical fluctuation.
However, since their setting is different from our setting
as explained in the second paragraph of Section III, our
analysis is different for their analysis.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II discusses the decoy method when the
source intensities are controlled. Then, we explain our
improved formula for the asymptotic key generation rate.
We derive the optimal decoy intensity of this case. Sec-
tion III extends the above result to the case when the
source intensities cannot be perfectly identified. Section
IV discusses the relation of the obtained result with the
finite-length case [18]. Several proofs are given in Ap-
pendixes.
II. CONTROLLED SOURCE INTENSITIES
First, we discuss the case when the source intensities
are controlled. To discuss this case, we recall the im-
proved GLLP formula [12, 13]. When we distill the secure
key from given M -bits raw key in the bit basis from the
signal pulse, we firstly apply error correction and then
obtain (1 − ηh(es,+))M -bits corrected key, where es,+ is
the error rate in the bit basis of the signal pulse. Here,
2h is the binary entropy with the logarithm to the base
2 and the parameter η is the efficiency of error correc-
tion, which is chosen to be 1.1 in a realistic case and to
be 1 in the ideal case. The next step, the privacy am-
plification, requires the ratio p : q : r (p + q + r = 1)
of the vacuum pulse, the single photon pulse, and the
multi-photon pulse among the received pulses. When
the error rate of the phase basis in the single photon
pulse is e×, it is enough to apply universal2 hash func-
tions sacrificing (qh(e×) + r)M bits [22–24]. Hence, we
can obtain (1 − ηh(es,+) − qh(e×) − r)M bits of secure
key. That is, the secure key generation rate per received
pulse with the matched basis is 1−ηh(es,+)−qh(e×)−r.
The rates q and r can be calculated from the detec-
tion rates a, p0, and ps,+ of the single photon pulse,
the vacuum pulse and the signal pulse as follows. Since
the signal pulse has the intensity µs, the transmitted
signal pulses consist of the vacuum pulse, the single
photon pulse, and the multi-photon pulse with the ra-
tio e−µs : µse
−µs : 1 − (1 + µs)e
−µs . Then, the ra-
tio of the vacuum pulse, the single photon pulse, and
the multi-photon pulse among detected signal pulses is
p0e
−µs : aµse
−µs : ps,+ − (p0 + aµs)e
−µs . That is,
q = aµse
−µs/ps,+ and r = 1 − (p0 + aµs)e
−µs/ps,+.
Therefore, the secure key generation rate per received
pulse with the matched basis is
(p0 + aµs(1 − h(e×)))e
−µs
ps,+
− ηh(es,+). (1)
However, the rate a and the phase error rate e× cannot be
directly measured although p0 can be directly measured
by transmitting the vacuum pulse.
The decoy method enables us to estimate the quanti-
ties a and e× by using the above measurable values and
the detection rates ps,× and pd,× of the signal and decoy
pulses with the phase basis, and the error rates es,× and
ed,× of the signal and decoy pulses with the phase basis.
These rates can be measured by randomizing the basis
and the intensity.
In the existing method [4–8], they derive the estimate
aˆ of the detection rate a of single-photon pulse and the
estimate bˆ of the rate b that the single-photon pulse is
detected with the phase error as follows.
aˆ(pd,×, ps,×)
:=
[
µ2se
µd(pd,× − p0e
−µd/2)− µ2de
µs(ps,× − p0e
−µd/2)
µdµs(µs − µd)
]
+
(2)
bˆ×(ed,×, pd,×) :=
[
ed,×pd,×e
µd − p0/2
µd
]
+
, (3)
where we assume that µd < µs. The above estimates of
the case µd > µs can be derived by exchanging the roles
of the decoy and signal pulses in the right hand side. The
key point of the derivation of (2) and (3) is the following
expansions of the states of the decoy and signal pulses:∑
∞
n=0 e
−µd µ
n
d
n! |n〉〈n| = e
−µd |0〉〈0| + e−µdµd|1〉〈1| + (1 −
(1 + µd)e
−µd)ρ2, and
∑
∞
n=0 e
−µs µ
n
s
n! |n〉〈n| = e
−µs |0〉〈0|+
e−µsµs|1〉〈1|+ β2ρ2 + β3ρ3, where the state ρ3 is chosen
properly. The estimate aˆ in (2) is derived from the non-
negativity of the detection rate a3 of the state ρ3, and
the estimate bˆ in (3) is from the non-negativity of the
rate that the pulse with the state ρ2 is detected with the
phase error. Substituting aˆ and bˆaˆ into a and e× of the
formula (1), we obtain the key generation rate.
In this paper, instead of aˆ, we estimate the rate c that
the single-photon pulse is detected without the phase er-
ror. Since a smaller c gives a better case, we can estimate
c in the same way as the detection rate a. Then, we ob-
tain the estimate cˆ as
cˆ(pd,×, ps,×, ed,×, es,×)
:=aˆ((1 − ed,×)pd,×, (1− es,×)ps,×), (4)
which is derived from the non-negativity of the rate c3
that the pulse with the state ρ3 is detected without the
phase error. Since the rate c3 is smaller than the rate
a3, the non-negativity of c3 is a stronger constraint than
that of a3. So, the estimate cˆ in (4) is better than the
estimate given in (2). Therefore, substituting cˆ + bˆ and
bˆ
bˆ+cˆ
into a and e× of the formula (1), we obtain a better
key generation rate.
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FIG. 1: Our key generation rate R(µs, µd) (red, normal) and
existing key generation rate R˜(µs, µd) [4–8] (blue, dashed)
with the decoy intensity µd = 0.1. The horizontal axis ex-
presses the signal intensity µd.
Now, we consider the case with no eavesdropper, i.e.,
the case when the true intensities coincide with our intent
intensities. In the following, the subscript s expresses
the signal pulse, and the subscript d expresses the decoy
pulse. Then, we adopt the following model for the detec-
tion rates pi,+, pi,× and the error rates ei,+, ei,× with the
parameters α and s [16, 17]:
pi,+ = pi,× = 1− e
−αµi + p0,
ei,+pi,+ = ei,×pi,× = s(1− e
−αµi) +
p0
2
, i = s, d, (5)
where α is the total transmission including quantum ef-
ficiency of the detector, and s is the error due to the
imperfection of the optical system.
3Under this assumption, we estimate the detection rate
a of the single photon pulse, the rate b that the single-
photon pulse is detected with the phase error, and the
rate c that the single-photon pulse is detected without
the phase error. By letting µ2 be the larger intensity of
µs and µd is and µ1 be the smaller one, their estimates
aˆ, bˆ, and cˆ are given as
aˆ(µ1, µ2) :=
µ22e
µ1((1− e−αµ1) + p0(1− e
−µ1))− µ21e
µ2((1 − e−αµ2) + p0(1 − e
−µ2))
µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1)
= (µ2µ1)
(1+p0)e
µ1−e(1−α)µ1−p0
µ21
− (1+p0)e
µ2−e(1−α)µ2−p0
µ22
µ2 − µ1
(6)
bˆ(µ1) :=
s(1− e−αµ1)eµ1 + p02 (e
µ1 − 1)
µ1
(7)
cˆ(µ1, µ2) :=
µ22e
µ1((1− s)(1 − e−αµ1) + p02 (1− e
−µ1))− µ21e
µ2((1 − s)(1− e−αµ2) + p02 (1 − e
−µ2))
µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1)
= (µ2µ1)
(1−s+p0/2)e
µ1−(1−s)e(1−α)µ1−
p0
2
µ21
−
(1−s+p0/2)e
µ2−(1−s)e(1−α)µ2−
p0
2
µ22
µ2 − µ1
. (8)
By using these estimates, the key generation rates R(µs, µd) and R˜(µs, µd) are written as
R(µs, µd) =


µse
−µs(cˆ(µd, µs) + bˆ(µd))(1 − h(
bˆ(µd)
cˆ(µd,µs)+bˆ(µd)
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(
ss,+
ps,+
) if µs < µd
µse
−µs(cˆ(µs, µd) + bˆ(µs))(1− h(
bˆ(µs)
cˆ(µs,µd)+bˆ(µs)
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(
ss,+
ps,+
) if µs > µd.
(9)
R˜(µs, µd) =


µse
−µs aˆ(µd, µs)(1 − h(
bˆ(µd)
aˆ(µd,µs)
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(
ss,+
ps,+
) if µs < µd
µse
−µs aˆ(µs, µd)(1 − h(
bˆ(µs)
aˆ(µs,µd)
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(
ss,+
ps,+
) if µs > µd.
(10)
Then, we obtain the following lemma, which will be
shown in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. (cˆ(µ1, µ2) + bˆ(µ1))(1 − h(
bˆ(µ1)
cˆ(µ1,µ2)+bˆ(µ1)
))
is monotonically decreasing for µ1 and µ2 when
bˆ(µ1)
cˆ(µ1,µ2)+bˆ(µ1)
< 12 . Similarly, aˆ(µ1, µ2)(1−h(
bˆ(µ1)
aˆ(µ1,µ2)
)) is
monotonically decreasing for µ1 and µ2 when
bˆ(µ1)
aˆ(µ1,µ2)
<
1
2 .
Now, we fixed a signal intensity to be µs. Then,
Lemma 1 implies
R(µs, µ1) ≥ R(µs, µ2) ≥ R(µs, µ3) ≥ R(µs, µ4)
for µ1 < µ2 < µs < µ3 < µ4. These inequalities imply
that a smaller decoy intensity has a better key generation
rate when the signal intensity is fixed. The same relation
holds for R˜(µs, µd). Therefore, we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. R˜(µs, µd) and R(µs, µd) are monotonically
decreasing with respect to µd for a given µs.
Note that although the argument for R˜(µs, µd) in The-
orem 2 was shown in [5], that for R(µs, µd) was not shown
in [5]. This theorem implies that a smaller decoy inten-
sity yields a larger key generation rate. In particular, the
optimal decoy intensity is infinitesimal small. Then, the
following lemma holds, which will be shown in Appendix
A.
Lemma 3. We also obtain
lim
µ1→+0
cˆ(µ1, µ2) = (1− s)α+
p0
2
, (11)
lim
µ1→+0
bˆ(µ1) = sα+
p0
2
, (12)
lim
µ1→+0
aˆ(µ1, µ2) = α+ p0. (13)
Substituting the above in (9) and (10), we have
lim
µd→0
R(µs, µd) = lim
µd→0
R˜(µs, µd)
=µse
−µs(α + p0)(1− h(
αs+ p02
α+ p0
)) + e−µsp0
− (1 − e−αµs + p0)h(
s(1 − e−αµs) + p02
1− e−αµs + p0
).
That is, in the limit µd → 0, we can perfectly estimate
the parameters a, b, and c. Since the signal intensity
is related to the detection rate of the signal pulse and
4other factors, it is not so simple to find the optimal signal
intensity.
III. UNCONTROLLED SOURCE INTENSITIES
Next, we consider the case when we cannot perfectly
identify the true intensities µs and µd. Similar to Wang
et al.[10, 11], we assume that the true intensities µs and
µd belong to certain intervals [(1 − ǫ)µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)µ˜s] and
[(1 − ǫ)µ˜d, (1 + ǫ)µ˜d] with the error ratio ǫ > 0, respec-
tively. In this case, we have to consider the worst case
with respect to the true intensities µs and µd in the in-
tervals [(1 − ǫ)µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)µ˜s] and [(1 − ǫ)µ˜d, (1 + ǫ)µ˜d],
respectively. Indeed, the smaller intensity pulse is gener-
ated by the combination of the stronger pulse and beam
splitter. If the beam splitter is well installed, the error
only comes from the error of the stronger pulse source.
In this assumption, the error ratio ǫ does not depend on
the intensity.
Here, we should remark the relation with the setting
in Ma et al [5]. They studied the case with the statisti-
cal fluctuation of the measurement outcomes [5, Section
IV]. However, we assume the source intensity is fixed but
is different from our intent, and infinitely large data is
available. That is, in our setting, there is no statistical
fluctuation in our data. Hence, our model is simpler than
their model. Although they could not obtain an analyt-
ical result in their model [5, Section IV], we derive an
analytical result in our model as follows.
Now, we treat the typical case when true intensities
are µ˜1 and µ˜2 and there is no eavesdropper. Instead of
(5), we assume that
pi,+ = pi,× = 1− e
−αµ˜i + p0, (14)
ei,+pi,+ = ei,×pi,× = s(1− e
−αµ˜i) +
p0
2
, (15)
for i = s, d. When we consider that the true signal and
decoy intensities are µs and µd, the detection rate of
the single photon pulse is a, the rate that the single-
photon pulse is detected with the phase error is b, and
the rate that the single-photon pulse is detected without
the phase error is c, the two key generation rates are
given as
R˜ = (p0 + aµs(1− h(
b
a
)))e−µs − ps,+ηh(es,+) (16)
R = (p0 + (b+ c)µs(1− h(
b
b + c
)))e−µs − ps,+ηh(es,+).
(17)
Then, using the functions
fa(p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
:=
[
µ22e
µ1(p1 − p0e
−µ1)− µ21e
µ2(p2 − p0e
−µ2)
µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1)
]
+
fb(s1, µ1) :=
[
s1e
µ1 − p0/2
µ1
]
+
fc(p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
:=
[
µ22e
µ1(p1 − p0e
−µ1/2)− µ21e
µ2(p2 − p0e
−µ2/2)
µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1)
]
+
,
we can estimate the parameters a, b, and c as
aˆ =
{
fa(pd,×, ps,×, µd, µs) if µd < µs
fa(ps,×, pd,×, µs, µd) if µd > µs
(18)
bˆ =
{
fb(ed,×pd,×, µd) if µd < µs
fb(es,×ps,×, µs) if µd > µs
, (19)
cˆ =
{
fc((1 − ed,×)pd,×, (1− es,×)ps,×, µd, µs) if µd < µs
fc((1 − es,×)ps,×, (1 − ed,×)pd,×, µs, µd) if µd > µs
.
(20)
Thus, when we consider that the true signal and decoy
intensities are µs and µd, by using the above estimates
aˆ, bˆ, and cˆ, the two key generation rates are given as
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
:=µse
−µs(cˆ+ bˆ)(1 − h(
bˆ
cˆ+ bˆ
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+),
R˜e(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
:=µse
−µs aˆ(1− h(
bˆ
aˆ
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+).
Therefore, by taking the worst case, the key generation
rates are given by
Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) := min
µi∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜i,(1+ǫ)µ˜i],i=s,d
Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, µs, µd)
R˜e(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) := min
µi∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜i,(1+ǫ)µ˜i],i=s,d
Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, µs, µd).
Indeed, it is quite difficult to find the values µs ∈ [(1 −
ǫ)µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)µ˜s], µd ∈ [(1 − ǫ)µ˜d, (1 + ǫ)µ˜d] realizing the
above minimums. However, our numerical demonstration
(Fig. 2) suggests the following when ǫ > 0 is sufficiently
small. When (1 + ǫ)µ˜d < (1 − ǫ)µ˜s, µd = (1 + ǫ)µ˜d and
µs = (1 − ǫ)µ˜s give the minimums. When (1 + ǫ)µ˜s <
(1 − ǫ)µ˜d, µs = (1 + ǫ)µ˜s and µd = (1 − ǫ)µ˜d give the
minimums. In the remaining case, we cannot distinguish
two intensities. So, the decoy method does not work.
Indeed, as will be shown in Theorem 4, µd = (1+ ǫ)µ˜d
and µs = (1− ǫ)µ˜s give the minimum Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) under
the limit µ˜d → 0.
As is numerically demonstrated in Fig 3, Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ)
and R˜e(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) are not necessarily monotonically de-
creasing with respect to µ˜d when µ˜s < µ˜d. However,
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FIG. 2: Graphs of Re(0.5, 0.1, µs, µd). Here, the true decoy
intensity µd is chosen to be 0.90 × 0.1 (orange), 0.95 × 0.1
(blue), 0.97×0.1 (red), 1.00×0.1 (green), 1.03×0.1 (purple),
1.05 × 0.1 (black), and 1.10 × 0.1 (yellow).
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FIG. 3: The graphs describe the key generation rate
Re(µ˜s, 0.3, ǫ) when the signal intensity is fixed to 0.3. The
horizontal axis expresses the decoy intensity µ˜d. Here, the
parameter ǫ describes the error rate between the true inten-
sities and our intents, and is chosen to be 0% (orange), 1%
(blue), 3% (red), and 5% (green).
our numerical analysis in Fig 3, suggests that the max-
imums of Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) and R˜e(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) are realized by
µ˜d → 0 with fixed µ˜s and ǫ > 0. This implication can be
shown as the following theorem, which will be shown in
Appendix B.
Theorem 4. When a fixed intensity µ˜s satisfies that
µ˜s(1 + ǫ) ≤ 1−
p0
( α1+ǫ + p0)(1− h(
s α1+ǫ+
p0
2
α
1+ǫ+p0
)
, (21)
we obtain
Re(µ˜s, ǫ) := sup
µ˜d:µ˜d<µ˜s
Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) = lim
µ˜d→0
Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ)
= lim
µ˜d→0
Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, (1− ǫ)µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)µ˜d)
=(1 − ǫ)µ˜se
−(1−ǫ)µ˜s(
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1 − h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
))
+ e−(1−ǫ)µ˜sp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+), (22)
R˜e(µ˜s, ǫ) := sup
µ˜d:µ˜d<µ˜s
R˜e(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ) = lim
µ˜d→0
R˜e(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ)
= lim
µ˜d→0
Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, (1− ǫ)µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)µ˜d)
=(1 − ǫ)µ˜se
−(1−ǫ)µ˜s(
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1 − h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
))
+ e−(1−ǫ)µ˜sp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+). (23)
This theorem implies that the infinitesimal small decoy
intensity gives the best key generation rate. Using this
theorem, we numerically demonstrate Re(µ˜s, ǫ) in Fig 4.
Then, we find the optimal signal intensity for our method
as in Table I.
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FIG. 4: The graphs describe the optimal key generation rate
Re(µ˜s, ǫ). The horizontal axis expresses the signal intensity
µ˜s. Here, the parameter ǫ describes the error rate between
the true intensities and our intents, and is chosen to be 0%
(orange), 1% (blue), 3% (red), 5% (green), and 10% (purple).
TABLE I: The optimal key generation rate Re(µ˜s,+0, ǫ), and
the optimal signal intensities µ˜s when the decoy intensity µ˜d
is infinitesimal. Here, the parameter ǫ describes the error rate
between the true intensities and our intents.
ǫ µ˜s Re
0% 0.539023 0.000136994
1% 0.539212 0.000133318
3% 0.539293 0.000125944
5% 0.535419 0.000119117
10% 0.528461 0.000102458
6IV. RELATION WITH THE FINITE-LENGTH
CASE
However, in the realistic setting, we have to care about
the length of our code. That is, we have to estimate the
parameters a, b, and c from the finite number of pulses.
Such a case has been discussed in the recent paper [18].
Due to the analysis in [18], the errors of the estimates a,
b, and c become large when the decoy intensity is close
to zero. So, we cannot say that a smaller decoy inten-
sity is better in the real implementation. However, when
the size of code is sufficiently large, we can expect that
the contribution of such errors is not so large. To verify
this implication, we numerically compare our asymptotic
key generation rate R(µd, µs) with the rates given in [18]
as Fig. 5. The numerical comparison suggests that the
finite-length case has a trend similar to the asymptotic
case. The paper [19] reports that privacy amplification
has been implemented with the bit-length of raw keys up
to 2 × 106. However, there is a possibility to improve
the method [19]. The forthcoming paper [20] will pro-
pose a new algorithm to realize secure hash functions.
Combining the method [19] and the algorithm [20], the
bit-length of raw keys was increased up to 108 [25]. So,
we can conclude that our asymptotic analysis has reflects
the trends of realizable finite-length codes.
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0.00008
0.00010
0.00012
R
FIG. 5: The blue graph describes the asymptotic key gener-
ation rate R(0.5, µd) with the signal intensity 0.5. The hor-
izontal axis expresses the decoy intensity µd. Other graphs
describe the key generation rate with finite-length codes, in
which, the number of each transmitted decoy pulses is one
tenth of the number of the transmitted signal pulses. The bit-
length of raw keys is chosen to be 108 (orange), 109 (green),
and 1010 (red).
V. CONCLUSION
First, we have improved the decoy protocol when we
employ only one decoy intensity and the vacuum pulse
by introducing the new parameterization of the channel.
Then, in both the existing method and our improved
method, we have shown that a smaller decoy intensity
gives a larger key generation rate in the asymptotic set-
ting. Hence, the infinitesimal decoy intensity realizes the
optimal asymptotic key generation rate, and yields the
perfect estimation of the counting rate and the phase
error rate of the single photon pulse. We also verify the
latter conclusion even when we cannot control or identify
the intensities µd and µs by assuming an assumption sim-
ilar to Wang et al.[10, 11]. Then, we have numerically
optimized the signal intensity under the optimal decoy
intensity. Finally, we have numerically checked that our
conclusion is almost valid even for finite-length code [18].
Acknowledgment
The author thanks Prof. Akihisa Tomita, Dr. Toy-
ohiro Tsurumaru, and Mr. Ryota Nakayama for valu-
able comments. He is partially supported by a MEXT
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) No. 23246071.
He is also partially supported by the National Institute
of Information and Communication Technology (NICT),
Japan. The Centre for Quantum Technologies is funded
by the Singapore Ministry of Education and the National
Research Foundation as part of the Research Centres of
Excellence programme.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemmas 1 and 3
Define the function f(c, b) := (c+b)(1−h( bc+b )). Since
the assumption implies
∂f
∂c
= 1 + log
c
c+ b
> 0,
∂f
∂b
= 1 + log
b
c+ b
< 0,
in order to show the first argument of Lemma 1, it is suf-
ficient to show that cˆ(µ1, µ2) is monotonically decreasing
for µ1 and µ2 and bˆ(µ1) is monotonically increasing for
µ1. Similarly, define the function g(a, b) := a(1 − h(
b
a)).
Since the assumption implies
∂g
∂a
= 1 + log
a− b
a
> 0,
∂f
∂b
= log
b
a− b
< 0,
in order to show the second argument of Lemma 1, it is
sufficient to show that aˆ(µ1, µ2) is monotonically decreas-
ing for µ1 and µ2 and bˆ(µ1) is monotonically increasing
for µ1.
Since
bˆ(µ1) =
s(eµ1 − e(1−α)µ1) + p0(e
µ1 − 1)/2
µ1
=sα+
p0
2
+
∞∑
n=2
(s(1− (1 − α)n) +
p0
2
)
µn−11
n!
(A1)
and s(1 − (1 − α)n) + p02 ≥ 0, bˆ(µ1) is monotonically
increasing for µ1.
7Further,
cˆ(µ1, µ2) = (µ2µ1)
(1−s+p0/2)e
µ1−(1−s)e(1−α)µ1−p0/2
µ21
− (1−s+p0/2)e
µ2−(1−s)e(1−α)µ2−p0/2
µ22
µ2 − µ1
=(µ2µ1)
∑
∞
n=1
(1−s+p0/2)µ
n−2
1 −(1−s)(1−α)
nµn−21
n! −
∑
∞
n=1
(1−s+p0/2)µ
n−2
2 −(1−s)(1−α)
nµn−22
n!
µ2 − µ1
=(µ2µ1)
∞∑
n=1
(1− s+ p0/2− (1− s)(1 − α)
n)(µn−21 − µ
n−2
2 )
n!(µ2 − µ1)
(A2)
=p0/2 + (1− s)α+ (µ2µ1)
∞∑
n=3
(1− s+ p0/2− (1− s)(1 − α)
n)(µn−21 − µ
n−2
2 )
n!(µ2 − µ1)
=p0/2 + (1− s)α− (µ2µ1)
∞∑
n=3
1− s+ p0/2− (1− s)(1− α)
n
n!
(
n−3∑
m=0
µm1 µ
n−3−m
2 )
=p0/2 + (1− s)α−
∞∑
n=3
(1− s)(1 − (1− α)n) + p0/2
n!
(
n−3∑
m=0
µm+11 µ
n−2−m
2 ). (A3)
Here, (1−s)(1−(1−α)
n)+p0/2
n! is always positive. Hence,
cˆ(µ1, µ2) is monotonically decreasing for µ1 and µ2.
Since similar to (A3), we have
aˆ(µ1, µ2)
=p0 + α
−
∞∑
n=3
(1− (1 − α)n) + p0
n!
(
n−3∑
m=0
µm+11 µ
n−2−m
2 ), (A4)
aˆ(µ1, µ2) is monotonically decreasing for µ1 and µ2.
Hence, we obtain Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 can be proven by substituting 0 into µ1 in
(A1), (A3), and (A4).
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 4
For a proof of Theorem 4, we prepare the following two
lemmas under the assumption that µd < µs.
Lemma 5. Assume that
aˆ = fc(1− e
−αµ˜d + p0, 1− e
−αµ˜s + p0, µd, µs) =
µ2de
µd(1− e−αµ˜d + p0)− µ
2
se
µs(1− e−αµ˜s + p0)
µdµs(µs − µd)
, (B1)
bˆ = fb(s(1 − e
−αµ˜d) +
p0
2
, µd) =
(s(1 − e−αµ˜d) + p02 )e
µd − p0/2
µd
, (B2)
cˆ = fc((1− s)(1 − e
−αµ˜d) +
p0
2
, (1− s)(1− e−αµ˜s) +
p0
2
, µd, µs)
=
µ2de
µd((1 − s)(1− e−αµ˜d) + p0/2)− µ
2
se
µ2((1− s)1− e−αµ˜s + p0/2)
µdµs(µs − µd)
. (B3)
Then,
(i) aˆ is monotonically increasing with respect to µ˜d and monotonically decreasing with respect to µ˜s.
(ii) bˆ is monotonically increasing with respect to µ˜d.
(iii) cˆ is monotonically increasing with respect to µ˜d and monotonically decreasing with respect to µ˜s.
(iv) bˆaˆ is monotonically decreasing with respect to µ˜d.
(v) bˆ
cˆ+bˆ
is monotonically decreasing with respect to µ˜d.
(vi) aˆ(1− h( bˆaˆ )) is monotonically increasing with respect to µ˜d and monotonically decreasing with respect to µ˜s.
8(vii) (cˆ + bˆ)(1 − h( bˆ
cˆ+bˆ
)) is monotonically increasing with respect to µ˜d and monotonically decreasing with respect to
µ˜s.
Proof. First, we notice that (1 − e−αµ˜i) is monotonically increasing with respect to µ˜i for i = s, d. Using this fact,
we can show the items (i), (ii), and (iii).
Next, we will show (iv). Since
bˆ =
µs(µs − µd)e
µds(1 − e−αµ˜d) + µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1 − e−µd)p0/2
µdµs(µs − µd)
,
we have
bˆ
aˆ
=
µs(µs − µd)e
µds(1− e−αµ˜d) + µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1− e−µd)p0/2
µ2de
µd(1− e−αµ˜d + p0)− µ2se
µs(1− e−αµ˜s + p0)
=
µs(µs − µd)e
µds(1− e−αµ˜d) + µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1− e−µd)p0/2
µ2de
µd(1− e−αµ˜d)− µ2se
µs(1− e−αµ˜s) + p0(µ2de
µd − µ2se
µs)
=
A1(1− e
−αµ˜d) +A2
A3(1− e−αµ˜d)−A4(1 − e−αµ˜s) +A5
,
where
A1 := µs(µs − µd)e
µds, A2 := µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1 − e−µd)p0/2,
A3 := µ
2
de
µd , A4 := µ
2
se
µs , A5 := p0(µ
2
de
µd − µ2se
µs).
As is shown below, we have A1A3 ≤
A2
A5−A4(1−e−αµ˜s )
. Thus, since 1− e−αµ˜d is monotonically increasing with respect to
µ˜d,
A1(1−e
−αµ˜d )+A2
A3(1−e−αµ˜d )−A4(1−e−αµ˜s )+A5
is monotonically decreasing with respect to µ˜d. Then, we obtain the item (iv). Now,
we will show A1A3 ≤
A2
A5−A4(1−e−αµ˜s )
. Since s ≤ 1/2 and µ2se
µs ≥ µ2d,
µ2de
µd(1− e−µd)p0/2 ≥ µ
2
de
µds(1− e−µd)p0 = sp0(µ
2
de
µd − sµ2d)
≥sp0(µ
2
de
µd − µ2se
µs) ≥ sp0(µ
2
de
µd − µ2se
µs)− sµ2se
µs(1− e−αµ˜s).
Hence,
s
µ2de
µd
≤
(1 − e−µd)p0/2
p0(µ2de
µd − µ2se
µs)− µ2se
µs(1 − e−αµ˜s)
.
Multiplying µs(µs − µd), we have
A1
A3
=
µs(µs − µd)e
µds
µ2de
µd
≤
µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1− e−µd)p0/2
p0(µ2de
µd − µ2se
µs)− µ2se
µs(1− e−αµ˜s)
=
A2
A5 −A4(1− e−αµ˜s)
.
Next, we will show (iv). We have
bˆ
cˆ+ bˆ
=
µse
µd(µs − µd)s(1 − e
−αµ˜d) + µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1 − e−µd)p0/2
µseµd(µs − µds)(1 − e−αµ˜d) + µseµd(1 − e−µd)(µs − µd/2)p0 −B1
=
B2(1− e
−αµ˜d) +B3
B4(1− e−αµ˜d) +B5
,
where
B1 :=µ
2
de
µs((1 − s)(1− e−αµ˜s) + (1− e−µs)p0/2)
B2 :=µse
µd(µs − µd)s
B3 :=µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1− e−µd)p0/2
B4 :=µse
µd(µs − µds)
B5 :=µse
µd(1− e−µd)(µs − µd/2)p0 −B1.
9As is shown below, we have B2B4 ≤
B3
B5
. Thus, since 1 − e−αµ˜d is monotonically increasing with respect to µ˜d,
B2(1−e
−αµ˜d )+B3
B4(1−e−αµ˜d )+B5
is monotonically decreasing with respect to µ˜d. Then, we obtain the desired argument for
bˆ
cˆ+bˆ
.
Now, we will show B2B4 ≤
B3
B5
. Since s < 12 , we have
s
(µs−µds)
< 12(µs−µd/2) , which implies
B2
B4
=
µse
µd(µs − µd)s
µseµd(µs − µds)
=
s(µs − µd)
(µs − µds)
<
µs − µd
2(µs − µd/2)
=
µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1− e−µd)p0/2
µseµd(1− e−µd)(µs − µd/2)p0
<
µs(µs − µd)e
µd(1− e−µd)p0/2
µseµd(1− e−µd)(µs − µd/2)p0 −B1
=
B3
B5
.
For a proof of (vi), we use the function g(a, b) defined in the proof of Theorem 1. Since g(a, b) is monotonically
increasing with respect to a and monotonically decreasing with respect to b, we obtain the item (vi). The item (vii)
can be shown in the same way by replacing the function g(a, b) by the function f(c, b) defined in the proof of Theorem
1.
Lemma 6. When µs ≤ (1 + ǫ)µ˜s,
sup
µd:0<µd<µs
fa((1 − e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) + p0, (1− e
−αµ˜s) + p0, µd, µs)
= lim
µd→+0
fa((1 − e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) + p0, (1− e
−αµ˜s) + p0, µd, µs) = α(1 + ǫ)
−1 + p0, (B4)
sup
0<µd
fb(s(1 − e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) +
p0
2
, µd)
= lim
µd→+0
fb(s(1− e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) +
p0
2
, µd) = sα(1 + ǫ)
−1 +
p0
2
, (B5)
sup
µd:0<µd<µs
fc((1 − s)(1− e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) +
p0
2
, (1− s)(1 − e−αµ˜s) +
p0
2
, µd, µs)
= lim
µd→+0
fc((1 − s)(1− e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) +
p0
2
, (1− s)(1 − e−αµ˜s) +
p0
2
, µd, µs) = (1− s)α(1 + ǫ)
−1 +
p0
2
. (B6)
Proof. Since fb(s(1−e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd)+ p02 , µd) =
(s(1−e−α(1+ǫ)
−1µd )+
p0
2 )e
µd−p0/2
µd
is monotonically decreasing with respect
to µd, we obtain (B5). Similarly, it is sufficient for (B6) to show that fc((1 − s)(1 − e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) + p02 , (1 − s)(1 −
e−αµ˜s) + p02 , µd, µs) is monotonically decreasing with respect to µd. Choosing α˜ := α(1 + ǫ)
−1, we obtain
fc((1− s)(1 − e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) +
p0
2
, (1− s)(1− e−αµ˜s) +
p0
2
, µd, µs)
=
µ2se
µd((1− s)(1 − e−α˜µd) + p0(1 − e
−µd)/2)− µ2de
µs((1− s)(1 − e−αµs) + p0(1− e
−µs)/2)
µdµs(µs − µd)
=
µ2se
µd((1− s)(1 − e−α˜µd) + p0(1 − e
−µd)/2)− µ2de
µs((1− s)(1 − e−α˜µs) + p0(1− e
−µs)/2)
µdµs(µs − µd)
−
µde
µs((1− s)(e−α˜µs − e−αµ˜s)
µs(µs − µd)
=p0/2 + (1− s)α˜−
∞∑
n=3
(1− s)(1 − (1− α)n) + p0/2
n!
(
n−3∑
m=0
µm+1d µ
n−2−m
s )−
µde
µs(1− s)(e−α˜µs − e−αµ˜s)
µs(µs − µd)
.
Since e−α˜µs − e−αµ˜s ≥ 0, the final term is monotonically decreasing with respect to µd. Other terms are also
monotonically decreasing with respect to µd.
Similarly, we have
fa((1− e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd) + p0, (1− e
−αµ˜s) + p0, µd, µs)
=p0 + α˜−
∞∑
n=3
(1− (1− α)n) + p0
n!
(
n−3∑
m=0
µm+1d µ
n−2−m
s )−
µde
µs(e−α˜µs − e−αµ˜s)
µs(µs − µd)
.
So, fa((1− e
−α(1+ǫ)−1µd)+p0, (1− e
−αµ˜s)+p0, µd, µs) is also monotonically decreasing with respect to µd. Therefore,
we obtain (B4).
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Proof of Theorem 4: First, we show the case of Re(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ). For a fixed µ˜s and µs satisfying (1 − ǫ)µ˜s < µs <
(1 + ǫ)µ˜s, Lemmas 5 and 6 imply
sup
µ˜d:0<µ˜d<
1−ǫ
1+ǫ µ˜s
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d) = sup
µd:0<µd<µs
min
µ˜d:(1−ǫ)µ˜d<µd<(1+ǫ)µ˜d
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= sup
µd:0<µd<µs
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)
−1µd) = lim
µd→+0
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)
−1µd). (B7)
Hence, we obtain
sup
µ˜d:0<µ˜d<µ˜s
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d) = lim
µ˜d→+0
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d) (B8)
= lim
µ˜d→0
Re(µs, (1 + ǫ)µ˜d, µ˜s, µ˜d).
Since the convergence (B7) is uniform with respect to µs and µ˜s, the convergence (B8) is uniform with respect to µs
and µ˜s. Hence, we obtain
min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
lim
µ˜d→+0
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= lim
µ˜d→+0
min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d). (B9)
On the other hand,
min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
lim
µ˜d→+0
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
sup
µ˜d:0<µ˜d<
1−ǫ
1+ǫ µ˜s
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
≥ sup
µ˜d:0<µ˜d<
1−ǫ
1+ǫ µ˜s
min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
≥ lim
µ˜d→+0
min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d). (B10)
Combining (B9) and (B10), we obtain
sup
µ˜d:0<µ˜d<
1−ǫ
1+ǫ µ˜s
min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
lim
µ˜d→+0
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
lim
µ˜d→+0
Re(µs, (1 + ǫ)µ˜d, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
lim
µd→+0
Re(µs, µd, µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)
−1µd)
= min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
µse
−µs(
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1 − h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+)
=(1 − ǫ)µ˜se
−(1−ǫ)µ˜s(
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1 − h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
)) + e−(1−ǫ)µ˜sp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+), (B11)
where the final equation follows from (21) and the following fact. Choosing the constant C = p0
( α1+ǫ+p0)(1−h(
s α
1+ǫ
+
p0
2
α
1+ǫ
+p0
))
,
we have
µse
−µs(
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1 − h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
)) + e−µsp0 = (
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1− h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
))(µse
−µs + Ce−µs).
Since the function µs 7→ µse
−µs +Ce−µs is monotonically increasing due to the assumption (21), we obtain the above
equation (B11). Thus, we obtain (22).
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Next, we show the case of R˜e(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ). Similar to (B7), using Lemmas 5 and 6, we have
sup
µ˜d:0<µ˜d<
1−ǫ
1+ǫ µ˜s
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
R˜e(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= lim
µd→+0
R˜e(µs, µd, µ˜s, (1 + ǫ)
−1µd).. (B12)
We also have the same relations for R˜e(µ˜s, µ˜d, ǫ). as (B9) and (B10). Hence, we obtain
sup
µ˜d:0<µ˜d<
1−ǫ
1+ǫ µ˜s
min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
min
µd∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜d,(1+ǫ)µ˜d]
R˜e(µs, µd, µ˜s, µ˜d)
= min
µs∈[(1−ǫ)µ˜s,(1+ǫ)µ˜s]
µse
−µs(
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1 − h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
)) + e−µsp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+)
=(1 − ǫ)µ˜se
−(1−ǫ)µ˜s(
α
1 + ǫ
+ p0)(1 − h(
s α1+ǫ +
p0
2
α
1+ǫ + p0
)) + e−(1−ǫ)µ˜sp0 − ps,+ηh(es,+).
Thus, we obtain (23).
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